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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years, the PIPE, or Private Investments in Public Equity, market has displayed 
robust growth and solidified its claim as a viable alternative for public companies seeking to 
raise equity capital.  While the market’s origins can be traced back more than two decades it 
truly emerged as a legitimate source of financing in the mid-1990s, when SEC Regulation S, and 
other amendments, allowed public firms to sell unregistered securities which could then be 
resold to the public market at a later date.  By the late-1990s the market had evolved and larger 
and more mature companies began issuing PIPEs, taking advantage of the securities issuance 
speed and ease.  Between 1995 and 2006 the total amount raised in the PIPE market grew at a 
32% compounded annual growth rate (see figure 1).  New PIPE offerings initially peaked in 
2000 at 1,106 transactions and $24.3 billion raised before falling off dramatically in step with the 
corrections in the major U.S. stock market indexes.  Since then, the PIPE market has rebounded 
strongly setting new issuance and capital raised records in 2006. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1 - Total PIPE Market
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 The largest segment of the PIPE market by number of transactions and amount issued is 
the common stock segment (see figure 2).  A common stock PIPE is a security with a fixed 
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number of shares that are issued to investors at a discount or premium to the market price.  These 
securities are restricted from being resold in the public markets until a resale registration 
statement is filed and declared effective.  Also, common stock PIPE issues sometimes include 
warrants as an added incentive for investors agreeing to participate in the PIPE transaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – PIPE Security Mix, 2000 - 2006
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 This paper explores the discounts and abnormal returns found in common stock PIPEs 
and contrasts it with those found in more traditional private equity placements.  The motivation 
behind my research is to determine whether common stock PIPE issuer’s compensate investors 
with lower discounts and experience higher abnormal returns.  Should this be the case, we ought 
to see more companies turning to common stock PIPEs as a viable private equity financing 
alternative, especially when the firm’s management believes its stock to be undervalued1. 
 Academic researchers have examined many critical issues in the PIPE market; however 
there appears to be no formal evidence on the determinants of common stock PIPE discounts or 
the long-term performance of common stock PIPEs.  As examples, a study by Hillion (2002) 
focused on structured convertible securities (a.k.a. death spirals) and the negative performance of 
the issuer’s underlying public stock, while a study by Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2003) 
                                                 
1 For a full discussion of the information hypothesis and its implications on an undervalued firm’s financing 
decision, see Hertzel and Smith (1993). 
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examined the motivations and returns of firms issuing PIPEs.  A study conducted by Brophy, 
Ouimet, and Sialm (2005) examined the performance of traditional and structured PIPEs.  A 
second study by Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2006) focused on hedge funds and their role in 
issuers’ negative performance.   
II.  PIPE DATA AND GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
Using PlacementTracker.com I was able to identify 3,174 closed common stock PIPE 
transactions in the U.S. between January 3rd 2000 and January 30th, 2006.  After eliminating 
issuers where I could not find PERMNOs2 in the Center for Research in Scientific Prices (CRSP) 
database, I was left with 2,308 transactions.  In addition, I eliminated issuers with less than 26 
months of stock return data on CRSP prior to their PIPE issue which left me with 1,651 PIPE 
transactions.  Also, I eliminated issuers that issued warrants and had a closing market price less 
than two dollars at the time of the PIPE transaction.  PIPE issuers with warrants were removed to 
allow me to better measure liquidity’s impact on PIPE discounts.  Stocks priced less than two 
dollars were removed to avoid measurement problems in raw and abnormal returns related to 
microstructure factors (Ball, Kothari, and Shanken (1995)).  Therefore, my final data sample 
consisted of 711 PIPE transactions. 
For each of these 711 transactions I obtained data from PlacementTracker.com, CRSP, 
and Compustat.   Using PlacementTracker.com I obtained premiums/discounts, gross proceeds, 
market capitalization at closing, investors, and post-deal raw stock returns.  Using CRSP I 
obtained pre-deal raw stock returns and cap-weighted index returns.  Finally, balance sheet and 
income statement data were obtained from Compustat. 
                                                 
2 The PERMNO is the principal identifier of a stock in the CRSP database and provides a reliable way of tracking stocks over 
time. 
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In reviewing the data, several firm specific observations are readily apparent as displayed 
in Table I.  First, firms issuing common stock PIPEs tend to be smaller firms with mean 
(median) sales and market capitalization of $271.9 million ($29.1 million) and $393.6 million 
($150.1 million) respectively.  Second, these firms tend to have low profitability with mean 
(median) EBITDA and net income of $2.97 million (-$1.93 million) and -$31.55 million and (-
$8.24 million).  Third, issuing firms require immediate financing as signaled by the mean 
(median) cash burn rate of 8.45 quarters (1.84 quarters).  Fourth, issuing firms tend to have 
minimal debt in their capital structure with median debt-to-assets of 12.59% and debt-to-equity 
of 1.77%.  The presence of minimal debt amongst issuers is not surprising because only 37.5% 
of the firms sampled had positive EBITDA. 
Several noteworthy contract features are also summarized in Table I.  First, gross 
proceeds from common stock PIPE issues are highly variable and ranged from $1 million to 
$1,232 million. The mean (median) gross proceeds are $28.37 million ($12.69 million).  Second, 
size of offering as a percentage of the issuer’s market capitalization is also highly variable and 
ranged from 0.01% to 338%.  The mean (median) offering size is 12.01% (9.13%).  Third, the 
mean (median) participation of hedge funds in a PIPE offering is relatively small at 30.32% 
(12.75%).  Fourth, discounts/premiums are highly variable and ranged from a -78.2% discount to 
a 92.7% premium.  The mean (median) discounts are -9.70% and (-10.13%).     
III.  DISCOUNT AND PREMIUM ANALYSIS 
Several studies suggest discounts in restricted stocks are used to compensate investors for 
expected monitoring, services and expert advice (Wruck (1989)), lack of liquidity (Silber 
(1991)), and/or the costs of due diligence (Hertzel and Smith (1993)).  However, the presence of 
discounts to compensate PIPE investors for expected monitoring, services, expert advice and due 
diligence costs seems unlikely.  First, PIPE investors are generally passive and do not appear to 
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increase firm value through monitoring.  Second, in private placements, resale restrictions are 
onerous (two years or more) and provide a strong incentive for investors to employ their 
specialized management and operational skills to increase the issuer’s public stock price and 
incur expenses to assess the issuer’s future prospects.  In contrast, PIPE investors face much 
shorter resale restrictions (30 to 180 days) and typically do not have access to material non-
public information.  Third, PIPE issuers generally repay investors’ expenses in connection with 
the transaction and its subsequent registration.  Also, it is not uncommon for issuers to repay 
investors reasonable out-of-pocket expenses.  Therefore, the difference in these key attributes 
between private placements and common stock PIPE issues3 suggest common stock PIPE 
discounts may reflect compensation to the purchaser for reduced liquidity.   
The average common stock PIPE discount of -9.70% was less than the -33.75% average 
discount observed in the restricted stock study by Silber (1991).  Common Stock PIPE issues 
should exhibit smaller discounts than restricted stock issues due to significant differences in their 
resale provisions and hence liquidity.  The SEC restricts holders of restricted stock from selling 
their shares in the open market for a minimum of two-years.  In contrast, PIPE issuers negotiate 
shorter periods, generally between 30 to 180 days, to file and declare effective their resale and 
registration statement.  However, the observed PIPE and restricted stock discounts are not 
necessarily comparable because the Silber (1991) study analyzed price differences between 
securities that were identical in all respects except for resale provisions.  Thus, without 
reviewing each individual PIPE’s SPA I cannot make the same claim.  Instead, I reviewed a sub-
sample of 20 random common stock PIPE cases and summarized my finding in Appendix I.  In 
the sub-sample I identified several special provisions which may impact the variability in 
discounts.  As an example, in two cases investors were guaranteed a seat on the issuer’s board.  
                                                 
3 The common stock PIPE sample included only those without warrants.   
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Also, investors’ resale provisions varied between 35 and 180 days.  However, overall the 
common stock securities issued pursuant to the PIPE offerings did appear identical to the 
issuer’s public common stock. 
III.1 Determinants of Discount and Premium Variability 
The determinants behind the significant variability in common stock PIPE issuer’s 
discounts warrant a closer investigation.  In this section, I examine the discounts in common 
stock PIPEs and some of their likely predictor variables.  For the remainder of this paper I 
replaced “discounts” with “premiums” to allow for logarithmic transformation in my regression 
analysis.  Premium is defined as [(Purchase Price Per Share) / (Closing Stock Price)] x 100. As 
an example, a discount of -35% is equivalent to a premium of 65.  The predictor variables I 
expect will explain the majority of the variability in premiums includes the issuer’s (i) public 
stock illiquidity, (ii) interaction between stock return volatility and illiquidity, (iii) under/over 
valuation, (iv) cash reserves, (v) recent stock performance, and (vi) investors who are hedge 
funds. 
I expect the issuer’s public common stock illiquidity will be inversely related to the PIPE 
issue’s premium.  Once the resale registration statement is declared effective, the higher the 
common stock’s illiquidity the more difficult it will be for investors to dispose of their shares.  
However, a positive relationship between the issuer’s common stock illiquidity and the PIPE 
issue’s premium may also exist.  If the PIPE issuer’s public common stock is already illiquid, 
then an investor does not lose much by holding a PIPE with resale restrictions; hence, the greater 
the illiquidity the larger the premium.  In my analysis I used the Average Relative Bid-Ask 
Spread as my proxy for illiquidity.  The relative bid-ask spread is measured as the dealer’s 
closing bid-ask spread divided by the average of the closing bid-price and ask-price.  The 
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average is based on the last trading day of each of the immediate five months prior to the closing 
date of the transaction.   
I expect the interaction between the issuer’s stock return volatility and illiquidity to be 
inversely related to its PIPE issue premium.  The greater the stock return’s volatility the higher 
investors should value the stock’s liquidity.  The PIPE issue’s risk is magnified when a stock’s 
illiquidity is high because the investor will have difficulty disposing of their shares and/or 
hedging their position through selling the stock short.  Thus, in my analysis I use the variable 
Risk*Illiquidity to account for the interaction between an issuer’s stock return volatility and its 
illiquidity.  Risk*Illiquidity is defined as (Standard Deviation of Returns) x (Average Relative 
Bid-Ask Spread).  The Standard Deviation of Returns is calculated using the 60 monthly returns 
immediately prior to PIPE transaction’s closing date.  For stocks where 60 monthly returns were 
not available, I used available returns as long as they were greater than or equal to 26 months. 
I expect the issuer’s book-to-market ratio to be positively related to the issue’s premium.  
A previous study has suggested private placement discounts reflect informed investors’ 
appraisals of true (lower) firm value (Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002), hereafter 
referred to as HLLR).  The evidence in the study is based on the three year post-announcement 
abnormal underperformance of restricted stocks.  If I use book value as a proxy for the firm’s 
true value, then the higher the firm’s book-to-market ratio the less overvalued the firm’s stock 
market price and the higher the premium investors should be willing to pay.  This hypothesis 
may not be as relevant to PIPEs because most PIPE investors want to maintain their trading 
flexibility and thus appraise the firm’s value with only public information.  In the event a PIPE 
investor receives material nonpublic information the investor may not conduct any transactions 
in the issuer’s securities until such information becomes public.  Therefore, the premium should 
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not reflect an investors’ appraisal of the firm’s true value because efficient market hypothesis 
asserts the price of the traded common stock should already reflect all public information.  
However, certain PIPE investors with longer-term investment horizons are willing to have their 
trading ability restricted; thus, this variable may still explain some of the variability in common 
stock PIPE premiums. 
I expect the cash-to-market ratio to be positively related to the issuer’s premium.  An 
issuer with a high ratio of cash to their market value of equity has the option to postpone a 
financing if it does not like the negotiated premium.  Alternatively, companies with a low ratio of 
cash to their market value of equity typically have fewer financing alternatives, less leverage in 
negotiating discount terms and may be forced to issue common stock PIPEs with a smaller 
premium. 
I expect an issuer’s six month stock price performance prior to its PIPE transaction to be 
positively related to the issuer’s premium.  Positive pre-issue stock price performance may signal 
the market expects improvements in the Company’s financial results.  Thus, investors may offer 
higher premiums to companies whose financial results are expected to improve. 
I expect the presence of hedge fund investors in a PIPE issue to be associated with 
smaller premiums.  Hedge funds investing in PIPEs use a myriad of trading strategies to hedge 
their risk.  As an example, a hedge fund can invest in a common stock PIPE issue, and after the 
PIPE transaction has been announced, can short the issuer’s public shares (assuming short selling 
is permitted within the SPA).  If the issuer’s common stock declines, the investor’s short-selling 
gains can be used to offset losses from its long position via the PIPE issue and vice versa.  The 
SEC’s investigations into insider-trading by hedge funds and the media’s attention on hedge 
funds roles in depressing issuers’ stock prices, may have contributed to PIPE issuers preferring 
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investors that are restricted from short selling, such as mutual funds.  Thus, the presence of 
hedge funds may signal the issuer has fewer interested investors and has to offer a smaller 
premium (larger discount) to entice investors to participate in the financing. 
I included closing stock price as an independent variable to determine whether removing 
stocks priced below two dollars could impact my results.  I do not expect an issuer’s closing 
stock price to have a relationship to the issuer’s premium.  
III.2 Regression Analysis and Results 
To gain a better understanding of the factors that best explain the premiums’ variability in 
common stock PIPE issues, I ran a regression analysis.  All else equal, I should expect higher 
premiums (smaller discounts) for issuers with low illiquidity, low Risk*Illiquidity, high book-to-
market ratios, high cash-to-asset ratios, good pre-issue stock price performance, and the absence 
of hedge fund investors participating in their PIPE offering.  Furthermore, I do not expect the 
relationship between stock prices and premiums to be statistically significant. 
Table II reports the results of my regression analysis.  To mitigate the effect of outliers, I 
trimmed (i.e., left out of the regression) the highest and lowest 1% issuer discounts and their 
associated independent variables.  My results show the overall significance of the regression is 
strong as indicated by an F-statistic of 21.4.  In addition, each of the independent variables, 
except for Risk*Illiquidity and Closing Stock Price, are statistically significant at the one percent 
level4.  Surprisingly, the pre-issue stock performance does not have the same sign as proposed by 
my hypothesis.  The issuer’s pre-issue stock performance appears inversely related to the issuer’s 
premium. Thus, holding all other variables constant, issuer’s whose stocks have performed better 
during the six months leading up to a PIPE transaction have smaller premiums.  This unexpected 
result may be due to the method of how premiums are measured in my analysis (see detailed 
                                                 
4 The Book-to-Market ratio is significant at the 5% level. 
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explanation in Appendix II).  Finally, the regression has a relatively low R2 (20.5%) which 
suggests there is considerable unexplained variability in the PIPE premiums not captured by my 
independent variables.  
IV.  Return Analysis 
Differences in abnormal returns following announcements of Seasoned Equity Offerings 
(SEOs), private placements and PIPEs have been widely documented.  Specifically, SEO 
announcements are followed by negative abnormal returns5.  In contrast, several empirical 
studies have found private equity issues are associated with positive abnormal returns during 10 
day event windows around the announcement date6.  However, companies issuing private 
placements see their performance reverse over a longer time period.  HLLR (2002) results show 
mean three-year abnormal returns following a private placement ranging from -45.2% to -23.8%.   
Abnormal returns of companies issuing traditional7 and unprotected8 PIPEs resemble 
private placements.  Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2005) found traditional PIPE issuers 
experience positive average abnormal returns of 5.6% during a ten-day event window around the 
announcement date and -8.4% the year following the issue.  Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2003) 
found unprotected PIPEs also experience positive average abnormal returns of 3.34% during a 
two-day event window around the announcement date and -9.3% the year following the issue.  
Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2005) suggest hedge fund investors may play a negative role in the 
PIPEs poor long term performance through their hedging activities (discussed earlier).  The study 
found the stocks of companies issuing traditional PIPEs where hedge funds are the major 
investors experienced significant negative mean abnormal one-year returns of -12.89%.  
                                                 
5 Smith (1986), Asquith and Mullin (1986), Masulis and Kowar (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Shyam-Sunder (1991), and 
Cornett and Tehranian (1994). 
6 Wruck (1989), and Brophy, Ouimet and Sialm (2004). 
7 Includes common stock and fixed convertible securities. 
8 Includes common stock and structured equity lines. 
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Evidence of a stock price reversal in traditional and unprotected PIPEs is surprising as market 
efficiency suggests a stock price correction due to the composition of investors would occur at 
the time of the announcement. 
In the following sections, I analyze the performance of common stocks issuing PIPEs.  I 
am interested in whether the post-issue long term abnormal returns of common stock PIPEs are 
negative, such as those found in private placements, traditional PIPEs, and unprotected PIPEs, as 
well as the determinants of common stock PIPEs long-term performance. 
IV.1 Return Observations 
Table III reports the raw and abnormal returns of companies issuing PIPEs one-month, 
three-months, six-months, and twelve-months after the close of their PIPE issue.  The 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is calculated as (raw return – market return * beta), where 
the market return is a portfolio of NASDAQ, AMEX or NYSE cap-based decile 10 firms (micro-
caps) according to the market of the issuer.  Surprisingly, common stock PIPEs display positive 
mean abnormal returns the year following the issue which is in contrast to the negative abnormal 
returns seen in traditional and unprotected PIPEs.  The t-statistic indicates that all of these 
abnormal returns are statistically significant at the one percent level.  The one-month and three-
month mean and (median) CAR for PIPE issuers were 8.07% (4.11%) and 8.92% (2.97%).  Over 
longer event windows, PIPE issuers still had positive abnormal returns.  The six-month and 
twelve-month CAR mean and (median) return for PIPE issuers were 10.08% (3.41%) and 
11.14% (0.11%).  Furthermore, the proportion of firms with positive abnormal returns in the one-
month, three-month, six-month, and twelve-month periods were 58.09%, 54.47%, 53.33% and 
50% respectively.  These results are statistically significant over all measurement periods, except 
for the 12-month window. 
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Panel A and B in Table IV reports the raw and abnormal returns of companies issuing 
common stock PIPEs with and without hedge fund investors.  The abnormal returns for 
companies with and without hedge funds as investors are positive.  The t-statistic indicates all of 
these abnormal returns are statistically significant at the one percent level9.  However, the 
abnormal returns in all event windows are higher for those PIPEs without hedge fund investors 
than those with hedge fund investors.  Panel C in Table IV reports the differences in abnormal 
returns for those PIPEs without hedge fund investors versus those PIPEs with hedge fund 
investors are statistically significant during the one-month, three-month, and twelve-month event 
windows.  These results are consistent with Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2005) findings that 
long-term abnormal returns are lower for PIPE issuers with hedge funds as investors. 
IV.2 Determinants of Long Term Performance Variability 
In the previous section, I found evidence that common stock PIPEs with hedge funds as 
investors performed worse than PIPEs without hedge funds as investors.  In addition to hedge 
funds, I am interested in determining what other variables contribute to common stock 
performance.  In this section, I examine the likely determinants of common stock PIPEs’ 
performance which are then used in a series of regression models.  Each model examines a 
separate independent variable, specifically the one-month, three-month, six-month, and twelve-
month CAR.  The predictor variables are (i) premium, (ii) relative size of offering, (iii) presence 
of hedge fund investors, (iv) beta, (v) book-to-market ratio, (vi) pre-issue stock performance, 
(vii) Risk*Illiquidity, and (viii) closing stock price. 
Hertzel and Smith (1993) suggest private placement discounts and stock price 
performance reflect the resolution of asymmetric information about the issuer’s value.  The 
positive abnormal returns displayed in common stock PIPEs may then reflect the investors’ 
                                                 
9 Excluding the twelve month CAR for PIPEs with hedge fund investors, which is significant at the 5% level. 
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assessments of the issuer’s true (higher) firm value.  Thus, I would expect the PIPE premium to 
be positively related to the issuer’s returns. 
The information hypothesis developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrates the 
announcement of a public equity issue conveys management’s belief the firm is overvalued.  
Hertzel and Smith (1993) extend the information hypothesis by demonstrating that undervalued 
firms who decline to issue publicly and do not have financial slack, can still pursue their positive 
NPV projects through a private placement.  Thus, management’s private placement decision 
conveys their private information (i.e., the firm is undervalued) to the marketplace.  Also, the 
positive information effect should be higher where the potential degree of undervaluation is high.  
Hertzel and Smith’s (1993) evidence shows a higher information effect where the firm’s 
investment opportunities are large relative to their assets in place.  The subsequent positive stock 
performance reflects the resolution of asymmetric information.  I used the relative size of the 
offering as a proxy for investment opportunities relative to assets in place and expect it to be 
positively related to the issuer’s returns.   
I expect the presence of hedge fund investors in a PIPE offering to be inversely related 
with returns.  As discussed earlier, hedge fund investors trading strategies may have a negative 
affect on PIPEs long-term performance.  Furthermore, I expect the common stock’s beta to be 
positively related to the issuer’s returns.  According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
expected asset returns are determined by their systematic risk.   
There has been considerable research on the relationship between an issuer’s pre-issue 
stock performance and its post-issue performance10.  Results show that both SEOs and private 
placement issues are preceded by run-ups in the stock prices of the issuers.  In contrast to SEOs, 
                                                 
10 Asquith and Mullin (1986), Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1990), Loughran and Ritter (1997), Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck 
and Rees (2002). 
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private placement issues follow periods of relatively poor operating performance.  HLLR (2002) 
show evidence that investors are overly optimistic about the issuer’s potential to improve their 
operating performance.  Moreover, HLLR (2002) suggest low book-to-market ratios prior to 
private placement issues are consistent with this investor over-optimism.  Thus, the negative 
post-issue stock price performance reflects investor disappointment about the issuer’s failure to 
reverse their poor operating performance.  I expect a PIPE issuer’s pre-issue abnormal 
performance to be inversely related to its three, six, and twelve-month post-issue abnormal 
performance.  Also, I expect a PIPE issuer’s book-to-market ratio to be positively related to the 
issuer’s post-issue abnormal performance. 
I expect the Risk*Illiquidity variable to be positively related to the issuer’s common stock 
returns.  Where Risk*Illiquidity is defined as (Standard Deviation of Returns) x (Average 
Relative Bid Ask Spread).  Friend, Westerfield, and Granito (1978) found a positive relationship 
between an assets expected return and its residual risk due to imperfect diversification.  Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) found a positive relationship between an assets expected return and its 
percentage bid-ask spread (i.e., illiquidity).   Stoll (1978) showed evidence that the interaction of 
risk and illiquidity is evident when market makers charge a higher spread on securities with 
higher volatility as compensation for the risk of their stock positions. 
Finally, I do not expect an issuer’s closing stock price level prior to its PIPE transaction 
to have a relationship to the issuer’s returns.  However, I included closing stock price as an 
independent variable to determine whether removing stocks priced below two dollars could 
impact my results. 
IV.3 Regression Results 
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Table V reports the results of my regression analysis.  My results suggest the issue 
premium and relative size of the offering are statistically significant and their signs are as 
predicted for all the event windows studied11.  Not surprisingly, companies with higher 
premiums (smaller discounts) perform better than companies with smaller premiums over all 
event windows.  In addition, companies with larger offerings relative to their market 
capitalization perform better than companies with smaller offerings over all event windows.   
The pre-issue CAR is also significantly related to the one-month and six-month CAR 
after the issue.  Consistent with my hypothesis, a PIPE issuer’s pre-issue abnormal performance 
is associated with a negative one-month CAR.  However, the statistically significant positive 
relationship in the six-month CAR post-issue is inconsistent with my hypothesis.  My hypothesis 
of an inverse relationship between an issuer’s pre and post-issue stock price performance implies 
expected improvements in the issuer’s operating performance fails to materialize.  However, this 
result may suggest the issuer’s operating performance actually exceeds investors’ expectations 
six-months after the issue.  Unfortunately, my research did not specifically look at operating 
performance trends post-issue and this alternative hypothesis can not be proven. 
The variable Risk*Illiquidity is statistically significant at the five percent level during the 
one-month event window.  Thus, riskier and less liquid issuers experience higher abnormal 
returns during the one-month window.  This result is consistent with my hypothesis that a 
security’s expected return must reflect its residual risk adjusted for its illiquidity. 
Finally, the closing stock price is statistically significant at the five percent level during 
the one and three-month event windows.  The inverse relationship suggests lower priced stocks 
outperform higher priced stocks during one and three-month event windows.  While this is an 
unexpected finding, if a positive relationship exists between closing stock price and firm value, 
                                                 
11Excluding the relative size of offering for three month CARs which is not significant. 
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the information hypothesis may be a plausible explanation.  Hertzel and Smith’s (1993) study 
show high information asymmetry is found in small firms.  Also, a study by Barth, Kasznik and 
McNichols (2001) found firm size was positively related with analyst coverage and thus 
information asymmetry.  Specifically, the process of managers communicating to investors 
during road shows and management presentations should resolve some of these asymmetric 
information issues and lead to positive abnormal returns.  As expected, a regression analysis 
confirms a statistically significant positive relationship at the one percent level between an 
issuer’s stock price and its market value during the one and three-month windows12. 
V.  Conclusion 
I found the impact of illiquidity on common stock PIPEs in my sample was -9.7%.  In 
addition, discounts tend to be larger for issuer’s with higher illiquidity, lower book-to-market 
ratios, lower cash reserves, higher pre-issue performance, and hedge funds as investors.  These 
results suggest common stock PIPE issuers may be able to reduce discounts and lower their cost 
of equity capital by offering shorter resale restrictions and attracting financing from non-hedge 
fund investors.  Also, the relatively modest discounts found in common stock PIPEs suggest 
firms contemplating a private placement may turn to common stock PIPEs as a viable financing 
alternative.  Furthermore, I found common stock PIPEs demonstrate positive abnormal returns 
over a one-year period, in contrast to the negative abnormal returns found in traditional and 
unprotected PIPEs.  The differences in abnormal returns are likely due to the presence of fewer 
hedge funds found in common stock PIPE offerings and confirm that hedge funds should be 
investors of last resort.  Also, the subsequent positive stock performance seems to reflect in large 
part the resolution of asymmetric information, thus confirming the benefits of adopting a strategy 
of increased transparency.
                                                 
12 For brevity, the regression analysis is not included in this paper. 
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Appendix I – Review of Security Purchase Agreements and Registration Rights Agreement 
 The following table provides a summary of my detailed review of 20 randomly selected 
common stock PIPE Security Purchase Agreements (SPA) and/or Registration Rights 
Agreements (RRA).  For each transaction I obtained the following items:  Hedge Fund % is 
defined as the percentage of the issuer’s offering funded by hedge fund investors.  Effective RRS 
are the number of days after the SPA is executed that the issuer agrees to have the registration 
rights statement declared effective.  Info Access is whether the issuer has agreed to provide 
material non-public information to their investor(s).  Hedging Restrictions is whether the 
investor is restricted from hedging securities sold in the PIPE offering.  Expenses Reimbursed is 
the expenses the issuer has agreed to repay the investor.  Reg. Fees are legal expenses repaid in 
connection with the subsequent registration.  OP≤$25K are out-of-pocket expenses no greater 
than $25,000 that the issuer has agreed to reimburse.  All issuers that repaid out-of-pocket 
expenses also repaid registration expenses.  Board Seat is whether the issuer guarantees the 
investor a seat on its board of directors.  To verify changes to the board’s composition, I also 
reviewed the issuer’s definitive 14A proxy’s one-year prior and one-year after the transaction. 
 
Ticker 
Symbol Closing Date
Discount/
Premium
Hedge 
Fund %
Effective 
RRS Info Access
Hedging 
Restrictions
Expenses 
Reimbursed
Board 
Seat
PRFT 2/4/2000 -35.63% 7.50% 83 N/A N/A N/A No
SFO 2/8/2000 -19.92% 7.00% 180 N/A No N/A No
CYRO 4/20/2000 7.26% 43.18% N/A N/A N/A N/A No
CERS 8/25/2000 -8.99% 0.00% 90 N/A No Reg. Fees No
ISCO 10/20/2000 10.00% 100.00% N/A N/A N/A N/A No
EPIQ 12/29/2000 -9.09% 0.00% 180 No No Reg. Fees No
UAG 2/27/2001 10.82% 0.00% N/A N/A N/A N/A 1
AMLN 5/11/2001 1.01% 74.47% 70 N/A No Reg. Fees No
SANG 6/20/2001 -16.98% 69.69% 120 Yes No OP ≤ $25K No
DAVE 11/12/2001 -21.77% 43.55% N/A N/A N/A N/A No
LESR 12/13/2001 -11.31% 0.00% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
WLSN 1/10/2002 -13.73% 95.02% 120 No No OP ≤ $25K No
EPAY 1/15/2002 -17.00% 0.00% 60 Yes 1yr restriction Reg. Fees 1
ULTI 5/12/2004 -9.09% 0.00% 90 No No Reg. Fees No
MLR 5/26/2004 5.51% 0.00% 35 No No Reg. Fees No
COBH 9/29/2004 -0.73% 0.00% N/A N/A N/A Reg. Fees No
ETC 2/11/2005 -0.93% 0.00% N/A Yes N/A N/A No
CNVR 7/1/2005 -7.98% 0.00% N/A N/A N/A N/A No
PPX 8/8/2005 -10.87% 0.93% 180 N/A No OP ≤ $25K No
ENG 9/29/2005 -13.15% 100.00% 90 N/A N/A N/A No
 
Summary of Findings: The effective registration rights timing varied, ranging between 35 to 
180 days.  Also, in the seven SPA’s where information disclosure was mentioned four SPA’s 
included a covenant that the issuer would not provide the investor with material non-public 
information.  Moreover, in one SPA investors were restricted from hedging transactions for a 
one-year period.  Also, in the ten SPA’s where expense reimbursement was mentioned all ten 
issuers agreed to pay for subsequent registration, whereas only three issuers agreed to pay for the 
investors out-of-pocket expenses no greater than $25,000.  In addition, two issuers granted one 
board seat to their PIPE investors.  In the UAG transaction the investor was a corporate investor, 
whereas in the EPAY transaction the investor was a private equity firm.  Finally, the only non-
standard provisions observed included the LESR transaction where the investor was entitled to 
designate a replacement CEO, and the PPX transaction where the investors had a 180 day lock-
up period during which the investors could not sell their shares. 
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Appendix II – Premium Calculation and its Relationship to Pre-Issue Returns 
 
 This appendix outlines my hypothesis on the inverse relationship between a stock’s pre-
issue performance and its post-issue performance.  The first paragraph outlines several important 
definitions and the second paragraph outlines the hypothesis and provides an example. 
 The PIPE Premium is defined as (Purchase Price Per Share) / (Closing Stock Price).  The 
Purchase Price Per Share is the amount of money the investor pays for each share of common 
stock.  In a common stock PIPE transaction the Purchase Price Per Share is a negotiated 
discount to the Market Price.  The Market Price is the closing bid price or volume weighted 
average price from one to 20 days prior to executing the purchase agreement.  The Closing Stock 
Price is the closing price of the common stock of the Company on the trading day immediately 
prior to the Closing Date of the transaction.  The Closing Date was obtained from 
PlacementTracker.com and can either be the date that the purchase agreement for the private 
placement transaction was signed by both parties (Closing Date #1) and/or the date that the 
actual funding of the private placement took place (Closing Date #2), depending on what 
information was provided by the Company in its public filings (see a typical PIPE transaction 
time-line in figure 3).   
 The potential inconsistency in recorded closing dates affects the relationship between a 
PIPE issuer’s pre-issue and post-issue performance.  Specifically, for issuers within my sample 
with Closing Date #2 in their premium’s denominator, I would expect the pre-issue stock 
performance to be inversely related to the issuer’s premium.  As an example, the purchase price 
(i.e., the numerator) is set on Day 0 and if the issuer’s stock price (i.e., the denominator) 
subsequently appreciates leading up to Closing Date #2 (i.e., the actual funding date) then the 
denominator will have increased while the numerator remains fixed, thus decreasing the 
premium.  
 
Day 0 
Issuer files Resale 
Registration 
Statement 
Day 10 - 60
Resale Registration 
Statement is 
declared effective 
Day 30 - 180 
PIPE Shares 
Tradable 
(2+ years) 
SEC Review 
(20 to 110 days) 
Closing Date #1: Purchase 
Agreement Signed 
“Market Price” 
Calculated 
(1 to 20 days) 
Purchase Price 
Calculated 
Figure 3 – PIPE Transaction Time-Line
Closing Date #2: 
Actual Funding 
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Table I - Sample Characteristics 
Premium is defined as [(Purchase Price Per Share) / (Closing Stock Price) – 1] x 100%.  
Standard Deviation of Returns is calculated using the 60 monthly returns immediately prior to 
PIPE transaction’s Closing Date13.  For stocks where 60 monthly returns were not available, I 
used available returns as long as they were greater than or equal to 26 months.  Illiquidity is 
defined as the average relative bid-ask spread.  The bid-ask spread is measured as the dealer’s 
closing bid-ask spread divided by the average of the closing bid-price and ask-price.  The 
average is based on the last trading day of each of the immediate five months prior to the closing 
date of the transaction.  Gross Proceeds is the dollar amount of the PIPE offering.  Market 
Capitalization at Closing is defined as (number of shares outstanding that is reported by the 
Company in the 10-K or 10-Q most recently filed prior to the Closing Date) x (the Company’s 
stock price on the trading day immediately prior to the Closing Date of the transaction).  Relative 
Size of Offering is defined as (Gross Proceeds) / (Market Capitalization at Closing).  Hedge Fund 
% is defined as the percentage of the issuer’s offering funded by hedge fund investors.  Book-to-
Market Ratio is defined as (most recent quarter’s book value of equity) / (Market Capitalization 
at Closing).  Cash-to-Assets Ratio is defined as (most recent quarter’s cash and marketable 
securities) / (most recent quarter’s total assets).  Cash Burn Rate is defined as (most recent 
quarter’s cash and marketable securities) / (most recent quarter’s EBITDA).  The Cash Burn 
Rate was only measured for firms with negative EBITDA.  Debt-to-Assets is defined as (most 
recent quarter’s book value of long-term debt) / (most recent quarter’s total assets).  Debt-to-
Equity is defined as (most recent quarter’s book value of long-term debt) / (Market Capitalization 
at Closing). 
 
 N Mean Median SD Max Min 
Premium 711 -9.70% -10.13% 18.06% 92.73% -78.18%
Standard Deviation of Returns 711 26.11% 24.21% 12.47% 94.51% 4.36%
Illiquidity 711 2.23% 1.48% 2.38% 15.16% 0.00%
Gross Proceeds ($MM) 711 28.37 12.69 76.04 1,232.25 1.00
Market Cap at Closing ($MM) 711 393.6 150.1 1,102.3 19,907.2 6.1
Size of Offering 711 12.01% 9.13% 18.55% 338.08% 0.01%
Hedge Fund % 711 30.32% 12.75% 35.75% 100.00% 0.00%
Sales TTM ($MM)  652 271.9 29.1 1,278.9 14,784.8 0.0
EBITDA TTM ($MM) 652 2.97 -1.93 77.26 1,423.27 -372.07
Net Income TTM ($MM) 652 -31.55 -8.24 199.21 788.60 -3,752.21
Book-to-Market Ratio 652 40.13% 21.48% 68.68% 948.54% -1.41
Cash-to-Assets Ratio 640 31.25% 20.58% 29.45% 98.97% 0.00%
Cash Burn Rate (Quarters) 404 8.45 1.84 48.44 857.65 0.00
Debt-to-Assets 624 21.50% 12.59% 25.56% 200.00% 0.00%
Debt-to-Equity 648 29.57% 1.77% 85.49% 858.63% 0.00%
 
                                                 
13 The Closing Date was provided by PlacementTracker.com and can either be the date that the Purchase Agreement 
for the private placement transaction was signed by both parties and/or the date that the actual funding of the private 
placement took place, depending on what information was provided by the Company in its public filings. 
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Table II – Regression Analysis of PIPE Premiums 
The dependent variable, Premium, is defined as [(Purchase Price Per Share) / (Closing Stock 
Price)] x 100.  The independent variables include: Illiquidity is defined as the average “relative 
bid-ask spread”.  The bid-ask spread is measured as the dealer’s closing bid-ask spread divided 
by the average of the closing bid-price and ask-price.  The average is based on the last trading 
day of each of the immediate five months prior to the closing date of the transaction.  
Risk*Illiquidity is defined as (Standard Deviation of Returns) x (Relative Bid Ask Spread).  
Book-to-Market Ratio is defined as (most recent quarter’s book value of equity) / (Market 
Capitalization at Closing).  Cash-to-Market is defined as (most recent quarter’s cash and 
marketable securities) / (Market Capitalization at Closing).  6 Month Pre-Issue Raw Return is a 
raw return and measures the 6 month period prior to the PIPE transaction’s Closing Date.  Hedge 
Fund is a dummy variable and is a 0 for PIPE issues without a hedge fund investor and a 1 for 
PIPE issues with a hedge fund investor.  Closing Stock Price is the closing price of the common 
stock of the Company on the trading day immediately prior to the Closing Date of the 
transaction.  In regression b, I trimmed the highest and lowest 1% issuer discounts and their 
associated independent variables.  ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.   
 
Dependent Variable: Premium LN 
  
  
a) Original  
Regression 
b) Trimmed at 
±1% Level 
Independent Variable 
Expected 
Sign Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Intercept  4.499 4.367 
Illiquidity LN (--) or (+) -0.027** -2.59 -0.035*** -3.99
Risk*Illiquidity LN (--) -3.734** -2.26 0.060 0.04
Book-to-Market LN (+) or NA 0.002 0.33 0.012** 2.03
Cash-to-Market LN (+) 0.013** 2.38 0.013*** 3.00
6 Month Pre-Issue Raw Return (+) -0.020*** -3.40 -0.010*** -3.75
Hedge Fund (Dummy) (--) -0.095*** -6.20 -0.091*** -7.27
Closing Stock Price LN NA -0.037* -1.94 -0.010 -1.26
  
R2 17.1%  20.5%
Adjusted R2 16.1%  19.6%
F 17.40  21.42
N 599  588
 
Note: LN refers to the variables natural logarithm. 
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Table III – Returns to Common Stocks of Companies issuing PIPEs 
 
The Cumulative Abnormal Return CAR is calculated as (raw return – market return * beta), 
where the market return is a portfolio of NASDAQ, AMEX or NYSE cap-based decile 10 firms 
(micro-caps) according to the market of the issuer.   The -6 Month CAR measures the 6 month 
period prior to the PIPE transaction’s closing date.  The +1, +3, +6, +12 Month CAR’s measures 
the period immediately after the PIPE transactions closing date to the end of the specified period, 
or until the firm is acquired.  The mean, median, standard deviation, % Pos±, Max and Min are 
expressed in percentage terms.  ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
All Investors 
 N Mean Median SD T-Stat % Pos± T-Stat Max Min 
-6 Month CAR 697 60.34 22.38 132.99 11.98*** 70.88 11.02*** 1,155.63 -124.25 
-6 Month Raw Return 697 65.49 19.05 150.05 11.52*** 67.86 -5.72*** 1,388.32 -93.64 
          
+1 Month CAR 701 8.07 4.11 27.43 7.79*** 58.09 -10.84*** 170.29 -99.31 
+1 Month Raw Return 707 7.03 2.54 29.68 6.30** 55.73 1.54* 171.84 -91.74 
          
+3 Month CAR 694 8.92 2.97 44.14 5.32*** 54.47 2.32** 449.77 -120.19 
+3 Month Raw Return 707 3.52 -2.92 46.61 2.01** 46.54 -1.84** 445.40 -94.35 
          
+6 Month CAR 675 10.08 3.41 52.19 5.02*** 53.33 1.73** 337.08 -118.54 
+6 Month Raw Return 706 2.25 -4.97 56.00 1.07 45.75 -2.26** 321.59 -99.96 
          
+12 Month CAR 642 11.14 0.11 71.06 3.97*** 50.00 0.00 589.00 -194.65 
+12 Month Raw Return 694 -3.17 -15.28 74.79 -1.12 39.05 -5.77*** 660.00 -100.00 
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Table IV – Returns to Common Stocks of Companies issuing PIPEs 
The Cumulative Abnormal Return CAR is calculated as (raw return – market return * beta), 
where the market return is a portfolio of NASDAQ, AMEX or NYSE cap-based decile 10 firms 
(micro-caps) according to the market of the issuer.   The -6 Month CAR measures the 6 month 
period prior to the PIPE transaction’s closing date.  The +1, +3, +6, +12 Month CAR’s measures 
the period immediately after the PIPE transactions closing date to the end of the specified period, 
or until the firm is acquired.  The mean, median, standard deviation, % Pos±, Max and Min are 
expressed in percentage terms.  ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: PIPEs without Hedge Fund Investors 
 N Mean Median SD T-Stat % Pos T-Stat Max Min 
-6 Month CAR 304 35.44 14.05 100.86 6.13*** 65.46 5.39*** 900.47 -124.25 
-6 Month Raw Return 304 37.03 9.66 115.89 5.57*** 58.88 3.10*** 970.41 -85.34 
          
+1 Month CAR 303 10.74 4.76 32.34 5.78*** 63.94 4.88*** 170.29 -99.31 
+1 Month Raw Return 306 10.36 4.49 33.54 5.40*** 58.82 3.09*** 171.84 -91.74 
          
+3 Month CAR 299 12.85 3.75 53.14 4.18*** 55.18 1.79** 449.77 -120.19 
+3 Month Raw Return 306 7.81 -1.08 54.87 2.49*** 48.69 -0.46 445.40 -94.35 
          
+6 Month CAR 295 12.69 4.05 56.26 3.87*** 55.59 1.92** 337.08 -118.54 
+6 Month Raw Return 306 5.38 -1.04 58.90 1.60* 48.69 -0.46 321.59 -99.96 
          
+12 Month CAR 284 15.29 5.26 70.48 3.66*** 55.28 1.78** 589.00 194.65 
+12 Month Raw Return 302 0.32 -11.44 76.05 0.07 42.05 -2.76*** 660.00 -100.00 
 
Panel B: PIPE’s with Hedge Fund Investors 
 N Mean Median SD T-Stat % Pos T-Stat Max Min 
-6 Month CAR 393 79.60 32.27 150.62 10.48*** 75.06 9.94*** 1,155.63 -83.43 
-6 Month Raw Return 393 87.50 34.18 168.76 10.28*** 74.81 9.84*** 1,388.32 -93.64 
          
+1 Month CAR 398 6.05 3.72 22.84 5.28*** 57.54 3.01*** 117.76 -63.05 
+1 Month Raw Return 401 4.48 1.47 26.12 3.43*** 53.37 1.35* 125.52 -72.59 
          
+3 Month CAR 395 5.95 2.51 35.64 3.32*** 53.92 1.56* 192.26 -71.07 
+3 Month Raw Return 401 0.25 -4.76 38.92 0.13 44.89 -2.05** 224.05 -82.99 
          
+6 Month CAR 380 8.04 1.51 48.78 3.21*** 51.58 0.62 216.45 -100.20 
+6 Month Raw Return 400 -0.15 -6.52 53.63 -5.59*** 43.50 -2.60*** 213.97 -90.67 
          
+12 Month CAR 358 7.85 -3.47 71.44 2.08** 45.81 -1.59* 504.67 -115.40 
+12 Month Raw Return 392 -5.85 -18.05 73.80 -1.57* 36.74 -5.25*** 580.20 -97.69 
 
Panel C: Abnormal Returns 
 -6 Month CAR +1 Month CAR +3 Month CAR +6 Month CAR +12 Month CAR 
No Hedge Funds 35.44 10.74 12.85 12.69 15.29 
- Hedge Funds 79.60 6.05 5.95 8.04 7.85 
      
Abnormal Returns -44.16 4.69 6.90 4.65 7.44 
T-Statistic -4.484*** 2.283** 2.085** 1.151 1.318* 
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Table V – Regression Analysis of PIPE Returns 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the PIPE’s CAR.  The independent variables include: Premium is defined as 
[(Purchase Price Per Share) / (Closing Stock Price)] x 100.  Relative Size of Offering is defined as (Gross Proceeds) / (Market 
Capitalization at Closing).  Hedge Fund is a dummy variable and is a 0 for PIPE issues without a hedge fund investor and a 1 for PIPE 
issues with a hedge fund investor.  Beta is calculated using the 60 monthly stock returns immediately prior to PIPE transaction.  For 
stocks where 60 monthly returns were not available, I used available returns as long as they were greater than or equal to 26 months.  
The Beta’s benchmark is a portfolio of NASDAQ, AMEX or NYSE cap-based decile 10 firms (micro-caps) matched to the market of 
the issuer.  -6 Month CAR measures the 6 month period prior to the PIPE transaction’s closing date.  Book-to-Market is defined as 
(most recent quarter’s book value of equity) / (Market Capitalization at Closing).  Closing Stock Price is the closing price of the 
common stock of the Company on the trading day immediately prior to the Closing Date of the transaction.  Risk*Illiquidity is defined 
as (Standard Deviation of Returns) x (Relative Bid Ask Spread).  ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
  One-Month Three-Month Six-Month Twelve-Month 
Independent Variable 
Expected 
Sign Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Intercept  -0.857  -0.960  -2.061  -3.462  
Premium LN (+) 0.221*** 3.63 0.268** 2.56 0.456*** 3.78 0.746*** 4.42 
Size of Offering LN (+) 0.024* 1.89 0.034 1.52 0.063** 2.44 0.075** 2.05 
Hedge Fund (Dummy) (--) -0.017 -0.70 -0.057 -1.34 -0.004 -0.08 -0.014 -0.19 
Beta LN (+) 0.008 0.70 0.018 0.88 0.014 0.57 -0.003 -0.08 
-6 Month CAR (--) -0.018* -1.90 0.025 1.44 0.034* 1.75 0.032 1.16 
Book –to-Market LN (+) -0.007 -0.67 -0.007 -0.36 0.012 0.58 0.013 0.42 
Risk*Illiquidity LN (+) 4.262** 2.19 -0.839 -0.25 0.302 0.08 7.242 1.30 
Closing Stock Price LN NA -0.037** -2.42 -0.072*** -2.67 -0.027 -0.85 -0.005 -0.10 
          
R2  8.2%  4.2%  4.5%  5.1%  
Adjusted R2  6.9%  2.8%  3.1%  3.6%  
N  565  559  541  513  
 
Note: LN refers to the variables natural logarithm 
 
